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A Lesson from Goodfellas:
Why Current Illinois Consideration Based
Pension Reform Proposals Still Fail
Lari A. Dierks
INTRODUCTION
In 2015, the Illinois Supreme Court found Illinois’ landmark pension reform
legislation unconstitutional under Article XIII, Section 5 of the Illinois Constitution.1
Subsequently, a proposal to reduce state pension liabilities by modifying pension benefits
using classic contract principles has resurfaced. The proposal was originally introduced
by Illinois Senate President John Cullerton in 2013. Most recently, it has been
championed by Governor Bruce Rauner. This Comment will analyze the constitutional
protection of public pension benefits in detail, using this analysis to evaluate why the use
of classic contract principles—offer, acceptance, and consideration—to modify pension
benefits is incompatible with the key goals of pension reform.
Two key goals of pension reform are to reduce the contribution the state is
statutorily required to pay to the pension systems each year and to reduce the state’s
unfunded pension liability. By reducing the state’s required pension contribution each
year, additional revenue is available to fund core government services at an increased
level without increasing revenue.2 Reducing the state’s unfunded pension liability creates
long-term stability for the pension systems.
Public employees have a unique position in this discussion, as employees are
promised a defined benefit3 upon retirement as a benefit of employment but are also

1

In re Pension Reform Litig., 32 N.E.3d 1, 30 (Ill. 2015). Article XIII, Section 5 of the Illinois Constitution
is commonly referred to as the “pension protection clause.”
2
As will be discussed in detail later in this Comment, the current pension debate often focuses on the need
for additional revenue for core services such as education, public safety, and human services. Kevin Olsen,
Meet Illinois’ $100 Billion Python: Squeezy, PENSIONS & INV. (Nov. 26, 2012),
http://www.pionline.com/article/20121126/PRINT/311269970/meet-illinois-100-billion-python-squeezy;
Jeffrey Brown, Illinois Public Pension Reform: A Simple but Radical Idea, FORBES (June 4, 2012),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffreybrown/2012/06/04/illinois-public-pension-reform-a-simple-butradical-idea/#602a18512382; Jeff Bailey, The Civic Federation’s Laurence Msall Discusses Illinois’ Dire
Finances, Reform, CHI. MAG. (Oct. 10, 2011), http://www.chicagomag.com/Chicago-Magazine/October2011/The-Civic-Federations-Laurence-Msall-on-Reform-and-the-Dire-Finances-of-the-City-County-andState/.
3
Defined benefit plans provide a benefit based on a set formula to the retiree for the duration of his or her
life. COMM’N ON GOV’T FORECASTING & ACCOUNTABILITY, ILL. GEN. ASSEMBLY, ILLINOIS STATE
RETIREMENT SYSTEMS: FINANCIAL CONDITION AS OF JUNE 30, 2017 (2018),
http://cgfa.ilga.gov/Upload/FinConditionILStateRetirementSysMar2018.pdf [hereinafter ILLINOIS STATE
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likely tax payers who benefit from government services. The recent spike in state
contributions to public pension plans has resulted in ongoing conversations about
modifying the statutory benefits for public employees.4
Public employees’ position in the pension debate stems from the dual impact of the
pension reform conversation on those employees. On one hand, if public employee
benefits are modified, each employee will likely receive less money over the course of
his or her retirement. On the other hand, if benefits are not modified, the state (or other
local employer) must find an alternative solution to ease budgetary pressures. That
solution would involve either a modified payment schedule that puts the fiscal health of
the retirement system at risk, or increased revenue, requiring employees to pay more in
taxes. While the legislature continues to debate whether benefits can be modified, the
Illinois Supreme Court has definitively established that the pension protection clause
does not allow the legislature to reduce an employee’s retirement benefit.
Part I of this Comment discusses the political and financial climate in Illinois which
led to the 2013 pension reform legislation and continues to pressure state actors to seek
pension reform proposals to manage the ballooning pension payment required by the
state. Part II gives a historical overview of the pension protection clause of the Illinois
Constitution. Part III discusses the Illinois Supreme Court’s interpretation of the pension
protection clause. Part IV analyzes the proposals to reform public pensions using contract
principles. Part V proposes that offering a subjectively superior benefit could survive a
legal challenge as true consideration if an employee voluntarily chooses to reduce their
pension benefit and briefly discusses non-legal alternative solutions.
I. A (PENSION) CRISIS—2008 AND BEYOND
Public pension benefits in Illinois are determined by state statute. 5 The benefits set
in statute are funded through three main sources: (1) employee contributions, (2)
employer contributions, and (3) investment returns.6 The state is the sole employer
contributor to the State Employees’ Retirement System (“SERS”), General Assembly
Retirement System (“GARS”), and Judges Retirement System (“JRS”).7 The state is the
primary contributor of employer contributions for the State Universities Retirement
Ssytem (“SURS”) and the Teachers Retirement System (“TRS”).8

RETIREMENT SYSTEMS]. SURS is the only state system that also offers a defined contribution plan similar
to a 401(k). Id. at 6.
4
Olsen, supra note 2; Brown, supra note 2; Bailey, supra note 2.
5
40 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-101 (West 1963).
6
See generally 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5.
7 For the purposes of this Comment, I focus on the proposed reform of the five state funded retirement
systems. SERS, SURS, and TRS account for the bulk of the pension contributions the state must pay each
year. The Judges Retirement System (JRS), and the General Assembly Retirement System (GARS), are an
extremely small portion of the total required contribution and unfunded pension liability.
8
The City of Chicago has its own pension plan for public school teachers, and the state only contributes a
small amount to this plan each year. 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/17-127.
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Until 2011, the state contributed an arbitrary percentage of payroll set in statute,
rather than the actuarially calculated amount required to fund benefits in the future. 9 The
state is now required to contribute an amount each year that is calculated by actuaries
employed by each pension system.10 The required state contribution is calculated using
various actuarial factors including retirement rates, mortality rates, disability rates, salary
growth, investment returns, and more.11
Public pension systems in Illinois have been underfunded for a century.12 Most
recently, the crisis stems from consistently poor investment returns compounded by
employer contributions below the actuarially required contribution level13 to fully fund
pension benefits.14 The aggregate funded ratio of a pension system is determined by
comparing the assets of the system with the current liabilities.15 In Illinois, the pension
systems assets are based on the average value of the systems’ assets over the past five
years, often referred to as “asset smoothing.”16 In 2000, the five state-funded public
pension systems had an aggregate funded ratio of 74.7%; the SERS (with the highest
funded ratio) was 81.7% funded at this time.17 As of 2015, the aggregate funded ratio had
fallen to 41.9%, a slight improvement from the lowest recent funded ratio of 38.5% in
2009.18 Between 2008 and 2009, the aggregate funded ratio plummeted from 54.3% to
38.5%.19
The state pension systems’ unfunded liability has continued to grow each year.20
Various factors have caused the growth in unfunded liability, including lower than
expected investment returns, inadequate employer contributions, and benefit
9

Act of Aug. 22, 1994, Pub. Act No. 88-593, 1994 Ill. Laws 1165, 1179–80; see ILLINOIS STATE
RETIREMENT SYSTEMS, supra note 3, at 15.
10
See generally 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5.
11
See generally SEGAL CONSULTING, TEACHERS’ RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS:
ACTUARIAL VALUATION AND REVIEW OF PENSION BENEFITS AS OF JUNE 30, 2017 at (2018),
https://www.trsil.org/sites/default/files/documents/Segal_Final_%20Actuarial_Valution_Report_TRS.pdf;
GRS RET. CONSULTING, STATE EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF ILLINOIS: ANNUAL ACTUARIAL
VALUATION AS OF JUNE 30, 2017 (2018),
https://www.srs.illinois.gov/PDFILES/Valuations/SERS/sers%202017.pdf; GRS RET. CONSULTING, STATE
UNIVERSITIES RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF ILLINOIS: ACTUARIAL VALUATION REPORT AS OF JUNE 30, 2017, at
(2018), http://www.surs.com/sites/default/files/pdfsx/avr17.pdf.
12
Aaron B. Maduff, Survey of Illinois Law: In re Pension Litigation, 40 S. ILL. U. L.J. 725, 725 (2016).
13
The statutory contribution is less than the contribution the system’s actuary would recommend to fully
fund the normal cost while paying down the unfunded liability. See ILLINOIS STATE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS,
supra note 3, at 33–34. The actuarially required contribution is the contribution recommended by the
system’s actuary in the actuarial evaluation. See id. at 34.
14
Id. at 27.
15
The User’s Perspective: Touring the Financial Statements, Part III: The Government Funds,
GOVERNMENTAL ACCT. STANDARDS BOARD,
http://www.gasb.org/cs/ContentServer?pagename=GASB/GASBContent_C/UsersArticlePage&cid=11761
56735732 (last visited Mar. 11, 2018).
16
ILLINOIS STATE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS, supra note 3, at 30.
17
Id. at 113.
18
Id. at 29.
19
Id.
20
COMM’N ON GOV’T FORECASTING & ACCOUNTABILITY, ILL. GEN. ASSEMBLY, BRIEFING ON CAUSES OF
STATE PENSION UNFUNDED LIABILITY 2 (2013), http://cgfa.ilga.gov/Upload/Presentation%206-27-13.pdf
[hereinafter BRIEFING ON CAUSES OF STATE PENSION UNFUNDED LIABILITY].
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enhancements.21 Although benefit enhancements22 were enacted by the legislature
without a matching employee contribution source,23 public employees have always
contributed the statutorily required percentage of their salary.24 Pension enhancements
that have been enacted by the Illinois General Assembly include an increased automatic
annual adjustment (commonly referred to as a Cost-of-Living Adjustment or COLA), a
higher multiplier for calculation of the initial pension benefit, increased benefits for
survivors, and more.
At the time benefit enhancements were enacted, no parties involved raised whether
increased contributions should be required from public employees to offset the increase.25
Although benefit enhancements are not the main contributor to the major increase in
required pension contributions,26 the legislature recognized that enacting such benefit
increases would require substantial additional funding.27
Since the drastic decline in the funded ratio and the resulting spike in unfunded
pension liabilities, credit rating agencies the business community have continued to
increase the pressure Illinois lawmakers to “reform” the public pension systems.28 The
key goals of pension “reform” are to reduce the state’s required contribution to the public
pension systems each year and to reduce the unfunded pension liabilities.
Between 2015 and 2016, the state’s required pension General Revenue Fund
(“GRF”) contribution increased by more than $1 billion.29 This is a 14% increase from
the previous year and constitutes over 20% of the state budget from general revenue
funds.30 The pension payment continues to grow at a rate substantially greater than state

21

Id. at 3—11.
A benefit enhancement is an increase in the statutory benefit a public employee is entitled to receive
upon retirement that has been approved by the legislature and signed by the governor. See, e.g., ILLINOIS
STATE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS, supra note 3, at 18.
23
Act of Aug. 23, 1989, Pub. Act No. 86-273, 1989 Ill. Laws 2002, 2004 (enacting a 3% compounded
automatic annual increase without a matching contribution from employees).
24
See generally 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5.
25
See Ill. H. Transcript, 86th Leg., Reg. Sess., 298–300 (June 30, 1989); Ill. S. Transcript, 86 th Leg., Reg.
Sess., 325–333 (June 30, 1989). While the debate recognized the increased benefits will require additional
funding, the legislature did not express opposition to the change from a 3% simple automatic annual
adjustment to a 3% compounded automatic annual adjustment without a corresponding increase to
employee contributions.
26
BRIEFING ON CAUSES OF STATE PENSION UNFUNDED LIABILITY, supra note 20, at 3—11.
27
Ill. S. Transcript, supra note 25, at 328 (Senator Schuneman discussed the increased pension liability that
would result from the proposed benefit increase).
28
See Eric M. Madiar, Is Welching on Public Pension Promises an Option for Illinois? An Analysis of
Article XIII, Section 5 of the Illinois Constitution, 48 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 167, 243–45 (2014) (discussing
proposals by the Commercial Club of Chicago and Sidley Austin LLP to reduce pension benefits through
reform); see also Meaghan Kilroy, Moody’s, S&P Downgrade Illinois Again as Budget, Pension Liability
Concerns Continue, PENSION & INV. (June 9, 2016),
http://www.pionline.com/article/20160609/ONLINE/160609865/moodys-sampp-downgrade-illinois-againas-budget-pension-liability-concerns-continue.
29
COMM’N ON GOV’T FORECASTING & ACCOUNTABILITY, ILL. GEN. ASSEMBLY, SPECIAL PENSION
BRIEFING 9 (2016) http://cgfa.ilga.gov/Upload/1116%20SPECIAL%20PENSION%20BRIEFING.pdf
[hereinafter SPECIAL PENSION BRIEFING].
30
Id.; CTR. FOR TAX & BUDGET ACCOUNTABILITY, ILLINOIS GENERAL FUND SPENDING IN FY2016: HOW
ELECTED OFFICIALS CUT BILLIONS IN CORE SERVICE EXPENDITURES WHILE WORSENING THE DEFICIT—
22
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government revenue growth each year.31 As a result, the required pension contribution
has continued to squeeze the discretionary spending available for important core
services.32
Public Act 87-1265 mandated the required pension contribution as a “continuing
appropriation” each year.33 A continuing appropriation is made by the comptroller to the
designated agency with or without a statutory appropriation by the General Assembly.34
So, if the General Assembly fails to enact a state budget, or does not include the pension
contribution in the budget, the required state contribution as determined by statute will
still be paid to the state pension systems.35 The General Assembly is still free to change
the contribution required in statute through normal legislative procedures.36 Accordingly,
the required contributions were still made to the state pension systems during the recent
budgetary stalemate.
It is widely acknowledged that the required pension contribution in Illinois has put
immense pressure on state funding available for education and human service programs.37
The annual statutorily required pension contribution continues to grow, compounded by
changes in actuarial accounting implemented by the pension systems’ Board of
Trustees.38 The required state contribution39 is currently more than 20% of the total
general revenue.40 In fiscal year 2018,41 the projected pension contribution required by
ALL WITHOUT CASTING A VOTE 3 (2016), available at http://www.ctbaonline.org/reports/illinois-generalfund-spending-fy2016-how-elected-officials-cut-billions-core-service.
31
General Revenue Growth dropped 3.9% from FY 2015 to FY 2016 and is projected to drop by 10.6%
from FY 2016 to FY 2017, while the pension payment grew 10% from FY 2015 to FY 2016. COMM’N ON
GOV’T FORECASTING & ACCOUNTABILITY, ILL. GEN. ASSEMBLY, FY 2016 ECONOMIC FORECAST AND
REVENUE ESTIMATE AND FY 2015 REVENUE UPDATE 25 (2015),
http://cgfa.ilga.gov/Upload/CGFAFY2016EconomicForecastAndRevenueEstimate.pdf; COMM’N ON GOV’T
FORECASTING & ACCOUNTABILITY, ILL. GEN. ASSEMBLY, FY 2017 ECONOMIC FORECAST AND REVENUE
ESTIMATE AND FY 2016 REVENUE UPDATE 24 (2016),
http://cgfa.ilga.gov/Upload/CGFAFY2017EconomicForecast&RevenueEstimate.pdf.
32
SPECIAL PENSION BRIEFING, supra note 29, at 23.
33
Act of Jan. 25, 1993, Pub. Act. No. 87-1266, 1993 Ill. Laws 4235, 4351.
34
40 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 15/1.1 (West 2017).
35
See generally 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 15.
36
The bill would have to pass the House and Senate with a majority of votes and be signed by the
Governor.
37
See, e.g., State of Illinois Pension Contributions to Increase Significantly in FY2018, CIVIC FED’N: INST.
FOR FISCAL SUSTAINABILITY, https://www.civicfed.org/iifs/blog/state-illinois-pension-contributionsincrease-significantly-fy2018 (last visited Mar. 11, 2018); Greg Hinz, There’s No Escape, Illinois: It’s
Time to Pay for Those Pensions, CRAIN’S CHI. BUS. (Oct. 1, 2016),
http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20161001/ISSUE05/310019998/theres-no-escape-illinois-its-timeto-pay-for-those-pensions; Dave McKinney, The Illinois Pension Disaster, CRAIN’S CHI. BUS. (Aug. 10,
2015), http://www.chicagobusiness.com/section/pensions.
38
ILLINOIS STATE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS, supra note 3, at 29.
39
Id.
40
General funds include the General Revenue Fund (GRF), the Education Assistance Fund, the Common
School Fund, and the General Revenue-Common School Special Accounts Fund. The GRF contains
revenue from the personal income tax, corporate income tax, sales tax, inheritance tax, public utility tax,
other various state taxes, and some federal sources. COMM’N ON GOV’T FORECASTING & ACCOUNTABILITY,
ILL. GEN. ASSEMBLY, FY2018 ECONOMIC FORECAST AND REVENUE ESTIMATE AND FY 2017 REVENUE
UPDATE 22 (2017), http://cgfa.ilga.gov/Upload/FY2018%20Economic%20ForecastRevenue%20Estimate%20and%20FY%202017%20Revenue%20Update.pdf [hereinafter FY2018
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the state was $7,650,293,451.42 The total estimated general funds revenue for fiscal year
2018 was $31,912,000,000.43 The $7.6 billion pension payment will account for
approximately 24% of the total general revenue the state takes in during fiscal year 2018.
In 2013, Illinois enacted legislation that attempted to address the substantially
increasing pension payments.44 That legislation was the result of years of discussion and
negotiation on the possible changes to pension benefits and the impact on the state
budget.45 In May 2015, the Illinois Supreme Court found the legislation unconstitutional
as a violation of article VIII, section 5 (“the pension protection clause”) of the Illinois
constitution.46 The unfunded liability of Illinois’ public pension funds continues to climb
each year and will continue to climb until at least 2028 if no action is taken by the
legislature and governor.47
II. ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 5–THE PENSION PROTECTION CLAUSE
In the 1970 Illinois constitution, the pension protection clause was included after
substantial debate.48 The clause establishes that:
Membership in any pension or retirement system of the State, any unit of
local government or school district, or any agency or instrumentality
thereof, shall be an enforceable contractual relationship, the benefits of
which shall not be diminished or impaired.49
The Illinois Supreme Court has interpreted the pension protection clause as forming
a two-part protection for public employee retirement benefits: (1) an enforceable contract
right to benefits, and (2) benefits which cannot be “diminished or impaired.”50 The court

ECONOMIC FORECAST AND REVENUE ESTIMATE]; CTR. FOR TAX & BUDGET ACCOUNTABILITY, THE
ILLINOIS STATE BUDGET AND TAX PRIMER 8 (2013),
http://www.ctbaonline.org/sites/default/files/FINAL_FY2013%20CTBA%20IL%20Budget%20and%20Ta
x%20Primer.pdf.
41
The state fiscal year (FY) runs from July 1 to June 30 each year. CTR. FOR TAX & BUDGET
ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 40, at 3. FY 2018 is July 1, 2017 to June 30, 2018.
42
ILLINOIS STATE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS, supra note 3, at 29.
43
FY2018 ECONOMIC FORECAST AND REVENUE ESTIMATE, supra note 40, at 22.
44
See Act of Dec. 5, 2013, Pub. Act No. 98-599, 2013 Ill. Laws 7148.
45
See id.
46
In re Pension Reform Litig., 32 N.E.3d at 30.
47
Currently, compounding interest works against the state pension systems due to the low funded ratio. As
a result, the system must sell assets each year to pay out retiree benefits. In 2028, the funded ratio will have
increased to a level that the compounding interest on investments will finally begin to pay down the
unfunded liability. SPECIAL PENSION BRIEFING, supra note 29, at 10.
48
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, SIXTH ILL. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, Verbatim Transcripts, vol. IV at
2925-31.
49
ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. XIII, § 5.
50
Id.; Jones v. Mun. Emps.' Annuity & Benefit Fund of Chi., 50 N.E.3d 596, 603 (Ill. 2016); In re Pension
Reform Litig., 32 N.E.3d at 7; Kanerva v. Weems, 13 N.E.3d 1228, 1241 (Ill. 2014).
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found that the clause is an absolute protection for all benefits flowing from public
employment.51
The Illinois Supreme Court first interpreted the meaning of the pension protection
clause in Kanerva v. Weems.52 In this case, the court first stated the pension protection
clause clearly creates a contractual relationship between the state and public employees
and the benefits of that relationship may not be unilaterally diminished or impaired. 53 The
following section will discuss how the Illinois Supreme Court has analyzed the pension
protection clause in several cases, including Kanerva, that challenged the
constitutionality of pension reform packages.
III. INTERPRETATION OF THE PENSION PROTECTION CLAUSE
The Illinois Supreme Court’s interpretation of the pension protection clause is
consistent across three recent opinions: Kanerva v. Weems,54 In re Pension Reform
Litigation,55 and Jones v. Municipal Employees’ Annuity & Benefit Fund of Chicago.56
These decisions provide substantial guidance on the scope of the pension protection
clause and the only opportunities available to modify public employee benefits.
The court’s broad interpretation of the scope of the pension protection clause in
Kanerva set the legal parameters for any future pension reform efforts by the
legislature.57 In this decision, the court explained that any benefit that “qualifies as a
benefit of the enforceable contractual relationship resulting from membership in one of
the state’s pension or retirement systems” “cannot be diminished or impaired.”58 This
sweeping interpretation was criticized by the dissent as a limitless holding that would
logically hold that a piece of legislation promising an honorary plaque “flows directly
from” or is “conditioned on” membership in the retirement system.59
The court’s holding in Kanerva hinged on its interpretation of Public Act 97-695,
which removed the statutory protection of subsidies to retirees for healthcare coverage,
allowing changes to be collectively bargained and modified by administrative rule.60 The
court explained that the drafters of the 1970 Illinois constitution knew various benefits
were attendant to membership in the pension systems.61 Consequently, the court inferred
that the drafters would have specified that only core pension annuity benefits are
protected by the pension protection clause and excluded all other employment benefits if
they had intended to limit the protections to only the retirement annuity.62 This means
51

Kanerva, 13 N.E.3d at 1239 (explaining the drafters of the 1970 Constitution knew certain employment
benefits [healthcare in this case] were connected to public pension benefits so those benefits in place at the
time the clause was adopted should be protected by the clause as well).
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
See generally id.
55
See generally In re Pension Reform Litig., 32 N.E.3d 1.
56
See generally Jones, 50 N.E.3d 596.
57
Kanerva, 13 N.E.3d at 1238–39.
58
Id.
59
Id. at 1246.
60
Act of June 12, 2012, Pub. Act No. 97-695, 2012 Ill. Laws 507, 530.
61
Kanerva, 13 N.E.3d at 1240.
62
Id.
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that the broad language of the pension protection clause covers all benefits associated
with public employment that the drafters of the 1970 Illinois constitution could have
envisioned.63
In the 2015, the court found Illinois’ landmark pension reform law, Public Act 98599, unconstitutional.64 The key components of Public Act 98-599 included benefit
modifications that affected the accrual of employee benefits going forward and modified
the required state contribution schedule.65 In this decision, the court stressed that: “[I]f
something qualifies as a benefit of the enforceable contractual relationship resulting from
membership in one of the state’s pension or retirement systems, it cannot be diminished
or impaired.”66 The court determined that the benefit modifications in Public Act 98-599
diminished public employee pension benefits because employees are entitled to the
benefit formula that was codified by statute at the time the employee began employment
with the state.67 Therefore, employees are entitled to the statutory automatic annual
increase even though it is not a component used to calculate the retiree’s original
retirement annuity.68
To defend the pension reform law, the state argued that its police powers permitted
the reduction of benefits as required to protect the health and welfare of all citizens from
the state’s dire financial situation.69 But, the court found this argument unpersuasive.70
The court explained that legislation which impairs a contract will only survive contract
clause scrutiny if the legislation is “reasonable and necessary to serve an important public
purpose” and its impact on employees is not excessively severe.71 The court went on to
recognize that changes to the factors used to calculate public pension benefits were an
impairment that is “obviously substantial.”72 The court concluded that as a matter of law,
the state could not prove a financial situation so dire that it would permit the benefit
modifications enacted in Public Act 98-599.73
Finally, in Jones, the court signaled that public pension benefits could potentially
be modified using classic contract principles.74 Yet, the court found that the changes to
pension benefits challenged in Jones did not satisfy the required criteria for a valid offer,
acceptance, and consideration.75 Therefore, the changes did not pass constitutional muster
for benefit modification.76 Pension benefits for members of the City of Chicago’s
Municipal Employees’ Annuity and Benefit Fund (MEABF) and Laborers’ Annuity and

63

Id.
In re Pension Reform Litig., 32 N.E.3d at 30.
65
2013 Ill. Laws 7148.
66
In re Pension Reform Litig., 32 N.E.3d at 16 (quoting Kanerva, 13 N.E.3d at 1239).
67
Id. (explaining the protections of the pension protection clause attach at the time an individual begins
employment in a position covered by a public retirement system, not when they retire).
68
Id.
69
Id. at 18.
70
Id. at 20.
71
Id. at 21.
72
Id.; see also Felt v. Bd. of Trs. of the Judges Ret. Sys., 481 N.E.2d 698, 702 (Ill. 1985) (stating same).
73
In re Pension Reform Litig., 32 N.E.3d at 21.
74
Jones, 50 N.E.3d at 609.
75
Id.
76
Id.
64
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Benefit Fund (LABF) are established by state statute.77 In an attempt to provide financial
stability to these funds, the City of Chicago negotiated with union representatives to
reach an agreement containing benefit modifications and increased funding
requirements.78 The court evaluated two arguments set forth by the City: (1) the financial
stability provided in exchange for the benefit reductions equaled a net benefit sufficient
to allow modification of the contract with employees, and (2) the agreement represented a
bargained-for exchange.79
First, the court found that the City’s argument was flawed from the beginning
because enhancing the City’s funding obligation was not a benefit entitled to
constitutional protection.80 The court held that the City’s assertion that providing
financial stability is a benefit was inconsistent with the plain meaning of the pension
protection clause because employees were previously entitled to statutory pension
benefits, regardless of the financial condition of the pension funds.81 Therefore, a current
“legally enforceable” benefit could not be used to justify the modification of pension
benefits.82 The court stressed that for pension modifications to conform to contract
principles, they would need to be made by mutual assent of the members, not by the
legislature alone.83
Second, the court held that the agreement was not the result of bargained-for
exchange because the union members negotiating the agreement were not authorized
representatives of the employees as a bargaining unit.84 An affidavit from the
Secretary/Treasurer and Chief of Staff of Service Employees International Union Local
73 (SEIU) detailing an approximately two-and-a-half-year negotiation process was
presented in support of the City’s argument that the enacted legislation was a bargainedfor exchange.85 Despite this letter, the court found that the unions were not acting as
authorized agents within a collective bargaining process during the relevant time.86
Therefore, the court did not find it necessary to resolve whether the individual members
could have “bargained away” their constitutional rights.87
Taken together, these cases illustrate the broad protections provided to public
employees by the pension protection clause. Nevertheless, proponents of pension reform
continue to search for clues in the language of the opinions that may provide an avenue
for constitutional modification of public employee pension benefits.

77

See 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/8; ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. V, § 11.
See Act of June 9, 2014, Pub. Act No. 98-641, 2014 Ill. Laws 138; Jones, 50 N.E.3d at 600.
79
Jones, 50 N.E.3d at 602.
80
Id. at 604.
81
Id. at 606.
82
Id. at 607.
83
Id. at 607–08.
84
Id. at 609.
85
Id. at 608.
86
Id. at 609.
87
Id.
78
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IV. CONSIDERING CONSIDERATION

As set forth above, the Illinois Supreme Court has consistently recognized that the
pension protection clause creates an enforceable contractual relationship between an
employer [state or local government] and public employees.88 In addition to creating a
contractual relationship, the clause “demands” that pension benefits not be “diminished
or impaired.”89
Discussion of legislation that would modify public employee pension benefits
continues in the wake of these decisions. Governor Bruce Rauner and Senate President
John Cullerton have proposed variations of the same idea to modify pension benefits—
offer the employee a “choice.”90 On January 11, 2017, President Cullerton introduced a
bill that would require employees to “choose” between (a) their current 3% automatic
annual increase, compounded each year, or (b) future salary increases being used to
calculate their pension benefits upon retirement.91 If an employee “chooses” to reduce his
or her automatic annual increase from 3% compounded each year to 3% simple or onehalf the Consumer Price Index (whichever is less),92 the employee’s benefit upon
retirement will be calculated in accordance with current law.93 Under current law,
pensionable salary is based on an employee’s average salary during a period prior to
retirement.94 If an employee does not elect to receive the lower automatic annual
increase, future salary increases will not be used to calculate his or her final average
salary upon retirement.95 Acceptance of this change would fundamentally modify the
calculation of an employee’s pensionable salary upon retirement. Thus, an employee
must choose whether to reduce the automatic annual increase or the benefit received upon
retirement.
The general thrust of these proposals focuses on the idea that public pension
benefits can be modified if consideration is given for the modification and an employee
consents to the change. The proposals rely on the court’s indication that classic contract
88

People ex rel. Sklodowski v. State, 695 N.E.2d 374, 377 (Ill. 1998) (citing ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. XIII,
§ 5) (“The plain language of the pension protection clause makes participation in a public pension plan an
enforceable contractual relationship and also demands that the ‘benefits’ of that relationship ‘shall not be
diminished or impaired.’”); In re Pension Reform Litig., 32 N.E.3d 1; Jones, 50 N.E.3d 596; Kanerva, 13
N.E.3d 1228.
89
Kanerva, 13 N.E.3d at 1239 (stating “it is clear that if something qualifies as a benefit” of membership in
a pension system of the State “it cannot be diminished or impaired”); In re Pension Reform Litig., 32
N.E.3d at 16 (citing the court’s holding in Kanerva to reinforce the belief that “the [pension reform] clause
means precisely what it says: [benefits cannot be diminished or impaired]”).
90
Doug Finke, Questions and Answers About Gov. Rauner’s Newest Pension Reform Proposal, ST. J.-REG.
(July 11, 2015), http://www.sj-r.com/article/20150711/NEWS/150719899; Monique Garcia and Kim
Geiger, Senate President Cullerton Offers New Pension Plan, CHI. TRIB. (May 13, 2015),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/ct-illinois-pension-reform-cullerton-met-0513-20150512-story.html.
91
S.B. 16, 100th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2017).
92
The employee will also not begin receiving an automatic annual increase until age 67. Id.
93
Id.
94
For Tier I employees, pensionable salary is the average of the highest four of the last ten years of
employment. See, e.g., ILLINOIS STATE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS, supra note 3, at 53. For Tier II employees,
pensionable salary is the average of the highest eight of the last ten years of employment. 40 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/1-160.
95
S.B. 16, 100th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2017).
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principles may be used to constitutionally modify pension benefits. 96 Additional support
for this idea is drawn from the court’s statement that pension benefits cannot be
“unilaterally diminished or eliminated.”97
As discussed, the court has held that the pension protection clause creates a
contractual relationship between the employer [state or local government] and the
employee.98 The court explained in Jones that to establish true consideration for
modification of an employee’s benefits: (1) modification must be knowing and voluntary
by the employee and (2) valid consideration must be presented in exchange for
modification of benefits.99 The court explained that contracts undertaken by the state
have a greater degree of protection than ordinary contracts between private parties.100
Further, the pension protection clause provides another layer of protection: benefits
associated with membership in a pension system shall not be diminished or impaired.101
For any proposed pension reform legislation, the legislature faces the challenge of
resolving the conflict between the court’s indication that pension benefits may be
modified through a bargained-for exchange and the court’s holding that a contract formed
under the pension protection clause requires heightened protection compared to an
ordinary contract.102
While an employee may agree to a reduction in benefits in exchange for
consideration, this agreement must be made knowingly and willingly.103 This protection
ensures that individuals will not be coerced into contract modifications without fully
knowing and understanding the implications of accepting the contract modification.104 In
accepting a modification, members are bargaining away the constitutional protections
given to employees in the pension protection clause.105 Although ordinary contract
principles can allow such a modification, the state will have to meet an incredibly high
bar in showing each employee had sufficient information to know the implications of
accepting reduced pension benefits.106
The argument that modification of pension benefits utilizing classical contract
principles of consideration could withstand constitutional challenge is valid. However,
this would require voluntary consent of the employee and the consideration given would

Jones, 50 N.E.3d at 609 (“To be sure, ordinary contract principles allow for the modification of pension
benefits in a bargained-for exchange for consideration.”).
97
In re Pension Reform Litig., 32 N.E.3d at 16 n.12 (emphasis added).
98
Id. at 1, 30.
99
Jones, 50 N.E.3d at 609.
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
Madiar, supra note 28, at 173.
103
Kraus v. Bd. of Trs. of the Police Pension Fund of Vill. of Niles, 390 N.E.2d 1281, 1292 (Ill. App. Ct.
1979); Jones, 50 N.E.3d at 609.
104
Consideration for Modification, 12A ILL. L. & PRAC. CONT. § 216, Westlaw (database updated Feb.
2018).
105
Jones, 50 N.E.3d at 609.
106
Id.
96
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have to be a benefit not currently offered to state employees as a condition of
employment.107 On both of these requirements, recent pension reform proposals fail.

A.

Proposal 1: “Choose” between your currently protected Automatic Annual
Increase or your (also currently protected) Pensionable Salary.

Governor Rauner’s proposal to offer employees a “choice” between automatic
annual increases (AAI) and pensionable salary increases108 is fundamentally flawed. The
AAI increases a retiree’s pension benefit by a statutorily set amount each year and is
commonly referred to as a Cost-of-Living-Adjustment.109 “Pensionable salary” is used to
calculate a retiree’s initial pension benefit and is based on the highest four of the last
eight years of employment for employees hired before January 1, 2011.110 AAIs and
pensionable salary increases are both benefits protected under the pension protection
clause.111 Because both benefits are constitutionally protected, it would be
unconstitutional to require public employees to “choose” one benefit or the other.
The Rauner proposal attempts to apply the principle laid out by the court in Jones
that pension benefits may be modified through a bargaining process. 112 In Jones, the City
of Chicago argued that ensuring the financial stability of the pension funds creates a new
benefit for employees.113 The court rejected this argument on several grounds, but
focused on the fact that employees already have “a legally enforceable right to receive the
benefits they have been promised.”114 The court explained an employee can “knowingly
and voluntarily” agree to modify pension benefits in exchange for “valid consideration”
(emphasis added).115
In Kanerva, the court held that state employee and retiree healthcare benefits are
protected by the pension protection clause.116 The statutory authorization of these benefits
is not found in the pension code. Still, the court explained: “[I]t is clear if something
107

Eric M. Madiar, Pension Benefits Under Siege: Does State Law Facilitate or Block Recent Efforts to Cut
the Pension Benefits of Public Servants?, 27 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 179 (2012); Madiar, supra note 28;
In re Pension Reform Litig., 32 N.E.3d 1.
108
Nick Blumberg, Lawmakers Discuss Governor’s Pension Proposal, Democratic Response, CHI.
TONIGHT (Jan. 21, 2016, 10:33 PM), http://chicagotonight.wttw.com/2016/01/21/lawmakers-discussgovernors-pension-proposal-democratic-response.
109
The statutory amount is 3%, compounded for each state funded pension system. See generally 40 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5. The amount varies for locally funded public pension systems. Id.
110
The calculation of final average salary was modified for employees hired after January 1, 2011, but is
not relevant for this Comment as reform proposals focused primarily on employees hired before January 1,
2011. 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1-160.
111
Modifications to AAI’s and pensionable salary were included in Public Act 98-599. 2013 Ill. Laws
7148; see, e.g., 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/14-114 (showing the Act included an “[a]utomatic increase in
retirement annuity”); 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/14-103.10 (showing the Act included “[c]ompensation”).
The court ruled those changes were unconstitutional. In re Pension Reform Litig., 32 N.E.3d at 16.
112
Compare Jones, 50 N.E.3d at 609, with Blumberg, supra note 108.
113
Jones, 50 N.E.3d at 609.
114
Id. at 607 (quoting In re Pension Reform Litig., 32 N.E.3d at 16).
115
Id. at 609.
116
Kanerva, 13 N.E.3d at 1239.
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qualifies as a benefit of the enforceable contractual relationship resulting from
membership in one of the state's pension or retirement systems, it cannot be diminished
or impaired.”117 The court went on to explain that the benefits protected under the
pension protection clause were not limited to only the retirement benefits set forth in the
Pension Code.118 Instead, benefits protected by the pension protection clause include
“subsidized health care both while an employee was working and after the employee
retired, life insurance, eligibility for a retirement annuity, disability coverage and survivor
benefits.”119 These benefits are included within the scope of the clause’s protection
because they were known benefits when the clause was enacted at the 1970
Constitutional Convention.120Additionally, although the court has not ruled on the
specific consideration that may be required in a bargained-for exchange that results in
constitutional modification of pension benefits, classical contract principles can be used
as a guide when analyzed within the recent court decisions.121
Applying the court’s logic to Governor Rauner’s consideration proposal, an
employee is not offered a true choice when required to choose between: (1) the current
3% automatic annual increase and (2) the ability to count future salary increases towards
pensionable salary. All public retirement benefits in Illinois are calculated using three
core components: (1) the salary of an employee prior to retirement, (2) the number of
years the employee has been a member of the pension system, and (3) the statutory
multiplier set by the legislature.122 While each system has unique intricacies, these basic
components are used to calculate the benefit all public employees receive upon
retirement.123 Every year after retirement, this core benefit is increased through a
statutorily set automatic annual increase (COLA).124 Both of Governor Rauner’s
proposed “options” are protected benefits under the pension code;125 accordingly
choosing one of these “options” does not confer a new benefit on the employee that
would constitute valid consideration.
Instead, this illusory choice would result in an unconstitutional diminishment of the
employee’s benefit. Eric Madiar126 previously recognized this point when he explained
that most state employees “already have job and salary protection under the Personnel
Code and collective bargaining agreements.”127 Accordingly, future salary increases are a
117

Kanerva, 13 N.E.3d at 1239.
Id. at 1240.
119
Id. at 1243.
120
Id. at 1242.
121
Doyle v. Holy Cross Hosp., 708 N.E.2d 1140, 1144–45 (Ill. 1999).
122
See generally 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5.
123
See id.
124
See id.
125
In re Pension Reform Litig., 32 N.E.3d at 17 (showing automatic annual increases and compensation
(the SERS term for pensionable salary) are key components of retirement benefits set forth in the pension
code).
126
Eric Madiar was President Cullerton’s General Counsel and point person on public pension reform
legislation. Madiar, supra note 28, at 167. He is recognized as a leading public pension expert in Illinois
and has received an award from the Illinois Public Pension Fund Association for his legal research on the
Illinois Constitution’s Public Pension Clause. Id. His work has critically analyzed the legal challenges to
reforming Illinois’ public pension systems. Id.
127
Id. at 272.
118
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protected benefit of public employment. Even if employees were no longer in collective
bargaining units, giving a current benefit back to an employee as “consideration” is
nonsense.128 In such a situation, the state would not suffer any detriment by returning to
the status quo: the employee would simply be made whole rather than receive any
additional benefit. Any concept of bargained-for exchange is eviscerated by such a
“choice.”
B.

Proposal 2: Incentives to Cave

Governor Rauner’s alternative proposal to offer members of SERS an incentive
package to voluntarily lower their pension benefits is a flawed solution, even though the
premise has a slightly stronger basis for constitutional permissibility.129 One reason the
“incentive package” is flawed is that it interferes with the current collective bargaining
structure—instituting the illusion of a benefit without providing an actual benefit to
employees—because an employee is simply being made whole once again by
“accepting” the incentive package. The court has not determined what circumstances are
necessary for employees to waive their constitutional rights. 130 Based on existing case
law, it is unlikely that the illusionary “benefits” in this package amount to true
consideration, as required for such a waiver.
The state, as an employer, cannot disregard obligations established to attract and
retain “a skilled and loyal workforce” simply because it now perceives the obligations to
be inconvenient or burdensome.131 In Doyle v. Holy Cross Hospital, the employer
changed the discharge provisions in the employee handbook after plaintiff employees
were hired.132 The employees argued the unilateral changes to the employment contract
were not supported by consideration because the “consideration” was more show than
substance.133 The court noted the “illusion (and the irony) . . . apparent” in the
asymmetric choice being given to employees: quit or accept the detriment.134
The Governor’s plan sets new “baselines” for members of the SERS.135 The
“incentive package” included in the proposal would return employees to their current
package of employee benefits.136 The sweeping opinion in Kanerva arguably protects all
128

People ex rel. Sklodowski, 695 N.E.2d at 377–78 (stating consideration consists of some detriment to the
offeror, some benefit to the offeree, or some bargained-for exchange between them, and that any act or
promise which is of benefit to one party or disadvantage to the other is sufficient consideration).
129
Finke, supra note 90.
130
Jones, 50 N.E.3d at 609 (finding it is unnecessary to determine whether the affidavit detailing the
negotiations bound members because the unions were not acting as authorized agents within a collective
bargaining process).
131
Doyle, 708 N.E.2d at 1147.
132
Id. at 1143.
133
The court goes on to explain that a current employee can receive future benefits added to a contract by
the employer because such a unilateral modification would be supported by consideration. Id. at 1147. An
employee is not required to accept future detriments simply because they would be able to accept future
benefits. Id. at 1148.
134
Id. at 1146 (quoting the appellate court ruling).
135
The new “baselines” would increase the time an employee must work to receive overtime pay from 37.5
hours to 40 hours, vacation time is “reset” (reduced), and “bumping rights” are modified. Finke, supra note
90. “Bumping rights” control when a newer employee can surpass an employee in the seniority level. Id.
136
Id.
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benefits associated with state employment.137 Although overtime and vacation benefits
are not directly set forth in statute, both benefits are included in the calculation of a
retirement annuity.138 Reducing these employment benefits to create a new “baseline”
would reduce the employee’s retirement benefit calculation upon retirement.139 The
illusion is apparent in the “choice” this proposal would give state employees between
lower pension benefits and the benefits adopted to attract and retain them.
Therefore, the Governor’s proposal to give employees the choice between a lower
“baseline” of vacation and overtime benefits or taking a reduced automatic annual
adjustment runs into the exact same problem as the proposal to choose between two
constitutionally protected pension benefits, even if it looks more palatable on the surface.
The court has explicitly stated that article VIII, section 5 applies to benefits beyond the
retirement annuity itself.140 Even if the benefits offered in the incentive package are not
constitutionally protected, the plan does not provide consideration by giving employees
the “choice” to return to the position they were in prior to the enactment this proposal.
Regardless of whether offering an incentive package for modification of retirement
benefits is permissible under the Illinois constitution, such a proposal could only apply to
the SERS.141 SERS accounts for only 23.6% of the total unfunded liability of state
pension systems;142 this leaves 76.4% of the total unfunded liability unaffected by this
proposal.143 Any similar employment benefit changes for members of TRS and SURS
would have to be implemented through local school districts, community colleges, and
state universities.
V. WHERE CAN WE GO FROM HERE?
A.

Knowing and Voluntary Consideration

In theory, public pension benefits can be modified if the state either: (1) provides a
benefit to the employee or detriment to the state sufficient to justify modification of the

137

Kanerva, 13 N.E.3d at 1243. The court discusses that although health coverage is not addressed in the
pension code, eligibility is conditioned on membership in one of the retirement systems. Id. As a result, all
benefits that flow from such a relationship are constitutionally protected under the pension protection
clause.
138
See, e.g., 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/14-103.10 (discussing “Compensation”).
139
In re Pension Reform Litig., 32 N.E.3d at 5 (explaining the amount of a retirement annuity benefit under
SERS is calculated based on (1) the member’s final average compensation, (2) their total service credit
(years of membership in the system), and (3) the statutory multiplier).
140
Kanerva, 13 N.E.3d at 1240 (“Giving the language of article XIII, section 5, its plain and ordinary
meaning, all of these benefits, including subsidized health care, must be considered to be benefits of
membership in a pension or retirement system of the State and, therefore, within that provision’s
protections.“).
141
The State is the employer for members of SERS. Members of TRS and SURS are employed by local
school districts, community colleges, and state universities. 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/14-101. The State
could pass legislation to encourage local employers to make employment modifications but does not
directly handle the employment contracts for members of TRS and SURS.
142
SPECIAL PENSION BRIEFING, supra note 29, at 1.
143
Id.
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contract (consideration);144 or (2) collectively bargains for modifications that are
knowingly and voluntarily accepted by employees (bargained-for exchange).145 But,
turning these principles into realistic pension reform is not so simple. There is a
fundamental inconsistency between the goal of pension reform—to lower the required
state pension contribution—and classic contract principles—providing a benefit to the
employee or detriment to the employer. Additionally, even if the state could reach an
agreement through collective bargaining to modify public pension benefits, the court has
yet to address whether employees’ constitutional rights can be “bargained away.”146
Proponents of the Governor’s proposal may argue that consideration could be
“knowing[ly] and voluntar[ily]” accepted on an individual employee basis.147 But, it
would likely be impossible for the state to adequately undertake an outreach program that
would overcome the court’s standard for adequately informing every individual of the
impact of their decision to accept a modification of benefits to ensure that each employee
is making a knowledgeable, voluntary decision.148
While the proposals discussed above fail on classic contract principles, a proposal
offering a true benefit to the employee could withstand a constitutional challenge.149 The
inconsistency between the goal of pension reform150 and offering consideration for
benefit reduction can be reconciled by offering a subjectively greater benefit to
employees than they are currently receiving.151 State employees receive a monetary
benefit upon retirement.152 Employees have been promised this benefit throughout their
career and the pension protection clause was enacted to ensure employees felt secure that
the benefit would be available upon retirement.153
144

In re Pension Reform Litig., 32 N.E.3d at 21 (explaining the burden is higher to justify modification of
state contracts).
145
See Doyle, 708 N.E.2d at 1146; Jones, 50 N.E.3d at 609 (articulating “classical contract principles” for
modification of employment contracts).
146
Jones, 50 N.E.3d at 609.
147
Pension Reform Bill (July 8, 2015), https://chicagotonight.wttw.com/sites/default/files/article/fileattachments/Summary%20of%20Rauner%27s%20Pension%20Plan.pdf, in Natalie Valdes, Analyzing Gov.
Rauner’s Latest Pension Plan, CHI. TONIGHT (July 9, 2015),
https://chicagotonight.wttw.com/sites/default/files/article/fileattachments/Summary%20of%20Rauner%27s%20Pension%20Plan.pdf; Mike Riopell, Rauner Backs
Pension Plan that Offers Choice, with Caveat, DAILY HERALD (Jan. 22, 2016),
http://www.dailyherald.com/article/20160121/news/160129798/; Sun-Times Staff, Rauner Backs Cullerton
Pension Plan–but Cullerton Says it’s Not his Plan, CHI. SUN-TIMES (Jan. 21, 2016),
http://chicago.suntimes.com/news/rauner-backs-cullerton-pension-plan-but-cullerton-says-its-not-his-plan/.
148
Buddell v. Bd. of Trs., State Univ. Ret. Sys. of Ill., 514 N.E.2d 184, 186–87 (Ill. 1987); Kraus, 390
N.E.2d at 1292; see also York v. Cent. Ill. Mut. Relief Ass'n, 173 N.E. 80, 82 (Ill. 1930).
149
Kraus, 390 N.E.2d at 1293 (“Nothing prohibits an employee from knowingly and voluntarily agreeing to
modify pension benefits from an employer in exchange for valid consideration from the employer.”); see
Chi. Coll. of Osteopathic Med. v. George A. Fuller Co., 776 F.2d 198, 208 (7th Cir. 1985) (showing under
the preexisting duty rule, agreement to do what one is contractually obligated to do is not valid
consideration).
150
The goal of pension reform is reducing the liabilities of the systems, which can only be achieved
through reduction of current benefits.
151
Terence R. Mitchell & Amy E. Mickel, The Meaning of Money: An Individual-Difference
Perspective, 24 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 568, 575–76 (1999).
152
See generally 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5.
153
In re Pension Reform Litig., 32 N.E.3d at 8.
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Non-monetary employee benefits could improve the lives of state employees
without a negative impact on the state budget. Potential alternative benefits include
increased flex time, improved working conditions, and career support systems, among
others. Incentive packages will only provide adequate consideration if new benefits are
included that are currently unavailable to employees.154
Additionally, incentive packages could potentially be accepted in two ways: (1)
through a collective bargaining agreement with an authorized agent of the union, or (2)
by allowing each employee to choose whether to modify their benefits by accepting the
new benefit package. If the package is accepted through the collective bargaining process
between an authorized union representative and the legislature, there will be more
certainty about the fiscal impact of the reform. However, the current political climate has
made it difficult to reach an agreement with union representatives.155 Allowing each
employee to modify their benefits by taking the new incentive package would be a
challenging process. The state would be required to adequately educate each employee
about the impact of his or her election to modify his or her employment benefits.
Requiring an employee to make a decision without adequate information could cause the
changes to still be found unconstitutional.156
Realistically, modification of pension benefits will not provide the budgetary relief
sought to fund other core state services at a higher level. Instead, the state will likely need
to look for alternative solutions to solve the current pension situation.
B.

Solutions Without Benefit Implications
1.

Increased Revenue

State revenue can always be increased by changing the tax structure. For years, the
legislature has discussed various proposals to increase revenue to fund the increasing
pension payment.157 These proposals include an increased income tax rate, instituting a
progressive income tax rate, expanding the sales tax base, and taxing retirement income
over a certain amount.158 Illinois is one of only three states that does not tax retirement
154

Kanerva, 13 N.E.3d at 1239–40 (explaining all benefits considered to be components of employment at
the time of the 1970 Constitution are protected within the scope of the pension protection clause).
155
The Governor introduced a package of legislative changes to various business and labor provisions after
taking office. See THE ILL. TURNAROUND, COMPILED PACKET (2014),
https://www.illinois.gov/gov/Documents/CompiledPacket.pdf. A commitment to passing these changes has
led to declining relations between the Governor’s office and union employees. Id.; Rick Pearson, Morning
Spin: Rauner Turnaround Agenda isn’t Shelved–Just on Hiatus Until After November Election, CHI. TRIB.
(July 1, 2016), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/politics/ct-bruce-rauner-budget-impasseaftermath-20160630-story.html; Brian Mackey, Illinois Issues: The Social Cost of Rauner v. Labor, WSIU
PUB. BROADCASTING (Oct. 24, 2015), http://news.wsiu.org/post/illinois-issues-social-cost-rauner-vlabor#stream/0.
156
Jones, 50 N.E.3d at 608 (“Whether members of the Funds may be ‘better off’ under the new terms of the
Act despite the unconstitutional diminishment of their benefits . . . is not for the General Assembly to
decide unilaterally.”).
157
See generally CTR. FOR TAX & BUDGET ACCOUNTABILITY, ISSUE BRIEF: A COMPARISON OF MAJOR
ILLINOIS TAX PROPOSALS (2010), available at http://www.ctbaonline.org/reports/issue-brief-comparisonmajor-illinois-tax-proposals.
158
See generally id.
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income159 and one of only eight states that has a flat income tax rate.160 Further, Illinois
taxes only seventeen services; the average number of services taxed by a state is fiftysix.161 Illinois has one of the narrowest tax bases in the country. Thus, Illinois could
rectify the current pension “problem” without benefit modification through reform of the
state tax code.162
Unsurprisingly, increasing taxes is not a politically popular option. In fact, from
2009–2016, the percentage of Illinoisans who favored fixing the budgetary deficit
through increased revenues alone has steadily remained around 10%.163 When looking at
party differences, Democrats favored increasing revenue alone slightly more at 16%, but
only 4% of Republicans approved of using revenue-only solutions to address the budget
deficit.164
On a more positive note, the percentage of Illinoisans who favor fixing the budget
deficit through both increased revenues and cuts to state services has increased slightly
since 2009, from 27% to 33%.165 Along the same lines, the percentage of Illinoisans who
favor a solution containing solely cuts to state spending has decreased by 10% since
2009, from 57% to 47%.166
While this data shows the political challenge presented by the idea of increasing
revenue, it also suggests an opening for a larger solution that combines increases in
revenue with reductions in spending. The spiking annual required contributions to the
five state-funded pension systems continues to strain the state’s fiscal health.167 As such,
without increased revenue the growing pension payment will continue to cut into the
revenue available to fund core services each year, including: elementary, secondary, and
higher education; human services; and public safety.
2.

Changes to the State’s Annual Required Contribution

Modification of the funding schedule provides another option to alleviate pressure
on the state budget. As noted at the beginning of this Comment, public employee
retirement benefits are funded through three main sources in Illinois: (1) employee
contributions, (2) employer contributions, and (3) investment returns.168 Each pension
system calculates the annual required state contribution using actuarial science to
Kari Lydersen, Age-Old Question: Time for State Retirement Tax?, BETTER GOV’T ASS’N (Apr. 20,
2016), http://www.bettergov.org/news/age-old-question-time-for-state-retirement-tax.
160
Jamey Dunn, Illinois Issues: Why Does the State Have a Flat Income Tax?, NPR ILL. (Apr. 21, 2016),
http://nprillinois.org/post/illinois-issues-why-does-state-have-flat-income-tax#stream/0.
161
See COMM’N ON GOV’T FORECASTING & ACCOUNTABILITY, ILL. GEN. ASSEMBLY, SERVICE TAXES: 2011
UPDATE, at i, (2017), http://cgfa.ilga.gov/Upload/ServiceTaxes2011update.pdf.
162
CTR. FOR TAX & BUDGET ACCOUNTABILITY, IT IS ALL ABOUT REVENUE: A COMMON SENSE SOLUTION
FOR ILLINOIS’ FISCAL SOLVENCY (2015), available at http://www.ctbaonline.org/reports/it-all-aboutrevenue-common-sense-solution-illinois%E2%80%99-fiscal-solvency.
163
John Jackson, Charles W. Leonard & Shiloh L. Deitz, The Climate of Opinion in Illinois 2008– 2016:
Roots of Gridlock, 47 SIMON REV. 1, 49 (2016).
164
Id.
165
Id.
166
Id.
167
Id. at 36.
168
See generally 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5
159
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estimate retirement rates, mortality rates, salary growth, and more.169 The systems also
set an assumed rate of return and discount rate.170 These factors are used to calculate the
state contribution that is required in the present year for the system to reach 90% funding
by 2045.171
In 1995, the current funding structure was enacted in Public Act 88-593.172 This
legislation gradually increased pension payments on a statutorily set “ramp” until
2011.173 In 2011, the state began making contributions at the actuarially required level for
each system to reach 90% funded by 2045.174 This is commonly referred to as a “funding
schedule.”
By lengthening the funding schedule, the legislature can reduce the pressure on the
state budget in early years but will pay more for the benefits in the long term.175 The
sooner pension systems are infused with funding, the sooner compounding interest begins
to help increase the funding level rather than increase the unfunded liability. Payments to
the systems increase drastically for the next ten years, but then will begin to level and
eventually decrease.176 To lessen the pressure on the state budget today, the statutory
funding schedule could be modified.
3.

Issue Bonds to “Buy Out” Members Benefits

A final note on non-legal solutions comes from recent discussions in the Illinois
House of Representatives. Several proposals have been introduced to allow members to
purchase their benefit as a “lump-sum buyout” as soon as they retire.177 Under these
proposals, members have the opportunity to receive the present value of their pension
benefit178 upon retirement instead of receiving annuity checks each month until their
death. Currently, a retiree can designate a survivor to continue to receive a benefit after

See, e.g., TEACHERS’ RET. SYS. OF THE STATE OF ILL., COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT
FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 2015, at 86–102 (2015),
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https://www.trsil.org/sites/default/files/documents/fy15_0.pdf.
170
Id. at 90.
171
See, e.g., 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/14-131 (discussing “Contributions by State”).
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1994 Ill. Laws 1165, 1179–80.
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Id.
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Id.
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Paying down the unfunded liability is like paying down credit card debt. When a household’s income is
not sufficient to pay off all of the debt at one time it accrues interest each month. As a result, the long-term
cost is higher, but the payments are sustainable for the household income.
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SPECIAL PENSION BRIEFING, supra note 29, at 29.
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H.B. 4427, 99th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2015); H.B. 5625, 99th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill.
2015). These plans are commonly referred to as a “pension buyout.” Olivia Mitchell, A Proposal for
Allowing State Pension Buyouts, FORBES, (Aug. 17, 2016),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/pensionresearchcouncil/2016/08/17/a-proposal-for-allowing-state-pensionbuyouts/#a44a51e337e2.
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The present value of a retiree’s benefit is calculated using many of the same actuarial factors discussed
above, including retirement, disability and mortality rates. See, e.g., Learn About Pensions:16.13
Calculation of Present Value of a Defined Benefit Pension, PENSION ANALYSIS CONSULTANTS, INC.,
http://www.pensionanalysis.com/CM/LearnAboutPensions/Calculation-of-Present-Va.html (last visited
Mar. 23, 2018).
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their death.179 The retiree would forfeit all benefits associated with membership in the
pension system.180
Implementing a buyout system would reduce future liabilities today. However,
allowing any retiree to take the buyout option can be dangerous to the financial stability
of the pension systems due to the poor funding levels. Instead, a more secure version of
this option would incentivize all inactive members181 to utilize the buyout option,
substantially reducing the current unfunded liability in a predictable manner.
CONCLUSION
Illinois faces drastically increasing pension payments that will continue to strain the
revenue available for other vital state services. While current employees’ retirement
benefits could be modified through classic contract principles, the illusory proposals
offered by Governor Rauner or Senate President Cullerton will likely fail in the courts.
To successfully withstand a constitutional challenge, the consideration offered to
employees must provide a true benefit that is not currently available to the employee.
While this idea is generally inconsistent with the overall goal of pension reform, it may
be possible to offer a new, subjectively greater, benefit to the employee that would result
in monetary relief for the state.
At the end of the day, significant decisions must be made by the Governor and the
legislature to ensure the fiscal health of the state and the pension systems. The Illinois
Supreme Court established the boundaries of these potential decisions through its
decisions emphasizing that pension benefits may not be unilaterally diminished or
impaired. It is true that the court may entertain modification of pension benefits using the
classic contract principles of valid offer, acceptance, and consideration. Still, the key to
this caveat left by the court focuses on the validity of the consideration offered. The
choice between two currently available benefits does not satisfy the test for valid
consideration; thus, it is unlikely that the current “consideration” proposals would
withstand the court’s scrutiny. Put bluntly, such a false promise of consideration does
nothing to rectify Illinois’ growing pension payments and liabilities. Going forward,
responsible debate should focus on true consideration, reform of the tax system, or
modification of the state’s statutorily required contribution.
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